

COLVIN'S WEEKLY REGISTER.

NO. 13.]

WASHINGTON CITY, APRIL 9, 1808.

[VOL. 1.]

AMERICA AND GREAT BRITAIN

—(continued from page 189.)—The course of conduct towards the United States by Great Britain at the close of our revolutionary war and the confirmation of our independence, was precisely contrary to that which good sense and a wise policy would have naturally dictated. Instead of conciliating us by acts of friendship and favor, her ministry gave a loose to their prejudices, and exemplified their fears of rivalry in commerce by restrictions badly calculated to make us forget her impositions. The first act which indicated the still-existing hostility of her disposition was an order by the king in council issued in the year 1783, limiting the commerce between the continent of America and her W. India colonies to ships British built; and in the second instance a treaty with France three years afterwards, (September 26, 1786,) which could have no other particular object by the liberal stipulations in favor of French merchants than to repress our maritime growth. Jealous of our enterprise, she sought not to enliven our peaceful efforts by any encouragement; whilst to the French, whom she had always considered her natural enemies, she admitted on principles of equality and reciprocity, a free intercourse with her subjects, by stipulating for the mutual importation and exportation of the commodities of each country at a very low *ad valorem* duty. She was then willing to divide with her oldest foe, the profits of a wide range of trade; not out of any ardent or sincere friendship she entertained towards France, but from a mistaken conception, that by an un-

derstanding and combination with her potent neighbor, she would effectually dishearten us from adventuring on the ocean to engage in a trade which would thus be engrossed by the two greatest maritime powers of Europe.

Great Britain never lost sight of this ill-judged policy towards us, but was urged to a more rigid observance of it by the spectacle which we afforded of the omnipotence of a persevering industry over every obstacle either natural or artificial; and the capability which the Americans displayed in all their undertakings. The commercial concessions which she had granted to France in the treaty of 1786, were calculated to draw that power from any intimate connections with us in the way of traffic, which might increase our importance and tend to lessen the consequence of G. Britain in the trading world. But no sooner did the troubles commence in France which preceded the revolution there, than the British government, notwithstanding the most solemn professions of neutrality by proclamation and otherwise, insidiously interfered in the affairs of that country, and began to form schemes for the ruin of the marine of her lately courted friend, and for the total annihilation of her commerce. So expert and watchful had the British ministry of that day been, that by the time they had provoked the French revolutionists to issue a declaration of war against England, they had formed treaties with Russia, Spain, Sicily, Prussia, Austria, and Portugal, in all of which there is a particular clause, stipulating in a very singular and remarkable manner for the destruction

of the commerce of France; besides subsidizing a number of the petty German princes to bring a military force into the field against the French. If any man wishes particularly to inform himself of the gigantic efforts made by Great Britain at that moment to overwhelm and crush France, he may amply gratify himself in that valuable collection of state papers published by Debret. There was deeper cunning and more system in such arrangements than any person at first sight might be disposed to admit.— France was the second commercial and naval power at that day in the world, and the dominion of the sea was then contested by her with considerable spirit and success. If she could be humbled, G. Britain became absolute mistress of the ocean, and could give every where laws to trade. Unhappily her policy has been too successful; and the efforts of the younger Pitt and his successors have been completely triumphant.

No sooner had Great Britain combined all the powers of Europe against France by land and sea, than she set herself particularly to annoy the commerce of the United States. On the 6th of November 1793, the king issued an order in council directing British cruizers to bring in for lawful adjudication all vessels laden with goods the produce of any colony of France, or carrying provisions or supplies for such colonies. This order was issued as a war measure against neutrals, and was directed pointedly at this country. On the 8th of January 1794, another order was promulgated, instructing ships of war to seize all vessels laden with goods, the produce of the French West India islands, and coming directly from any port of the said islands to any port in Europe. A third order of coun-

cil bearing date the 25th of January 1798, authorised cruizers to bring in all vessels laden with cargoes, the produce of any island of France, Spain or Holland, and coming directly from any port of the said islands or settlements to any port in Europe, not being a port of Great Britain nor of the country to which such ships, being neutrals, belonged. And on the 24th of June 1803, a fourth order was issued, making vessels, on suspicion of having conveyed contraband articles to her enemy, liable to capture on their return passages.

It is impossible not to perceive in these various and successive regulations, a steady and determined design on the part of Great Britain to thwart, perplex, and harrass our trade in every possible shape, in order to cripple, cramp, and reduce it to insignificance, or to compel us to abandon it altogether. Succeeding acts on her side towards us only tended to aggravate former proceedings.

The deadly enmity of Great Britain to France, and the rigidity with which she enforced her restrictions against the whole commerce of the world, could not have escaped the notice of the rulers of the French nation. They had seen their own marine annihilated, and the British navy tyrannize on the ocean, trample upon all existing codes of national law, and subvert the fundamental principles of civilized states. They could not but recollect that it was the cabinet of London that had sanctioned the treaty of Pilnitz by connivance and openly become a party to the convention of Pavia; that same cabinet which in truth had attempted to starve the French people at one time into submission, and had roused and subsidized all Europe, from the Gulph of Finland to the Black sea, a-

gainst them. After the convulsions of the revolution had subsided, and the government of France became consolidated in the person of Bonaparte, many interesting reflections upon such a review of the conduct of his enemy must have arisen in his mind, and imperiously instigated him to measures of retaliation. What wonder then that the decree of Berlin, in November 1806, should have made its appearance? Viewed strictly, the provisions of that decree operated only as municipal regulations. They did not prohibit our trade from one British port to another, nor from the ports of any power who permitted it to those belonging to Great Britain. The decree was a measure equally justifiable with an embargo, and of which, as it was general in its effects, we had no right to complain, except by way of remonstrance on equitable grounds and as it went to the suspension of a privilege secured to us by treaty. For my own part I cannot believe that any treaty can intervene to prevent a nation from exercising, within its own jurisdiction, within its own ports and harbors, the right of exclusion, provided it be not particularly directed against any single power claiming the privilege, as an act of hostility against that power; and where it is adopted as a measure offensive to its enemy. The principles of blockade by ships of war and those of exclusion by interdiction are bottomed on the same basis; and if France, by the laws of war, has the right of blockading any port of Great Britain to which we have otherwise a freedom of trade, she certainly has an equal right to preclude us from entering her own harbors, if she deems it a proceeding that will prove injurious to her enemy. At any rate it was for us, and not for

Great Britain, to decide how far it was proper for us to resent the imperial decree of Nov. 1806. But the British ministry decided differently. By way of retaliation, as they argued, an interdict issued from St. James's inhibiting us, not from British ports on the grounds that Bonaparte had done from French ports, but from trading from one French port to another, and from any places in the territories of the allies of France to any French or other ports of a sovereign in league with France. This interdiction was issued in January 1807. Notwithstanding the operation of this British order, for eleven months France never enforced against us the provisions of the decree of Berlin; and when at last she did so, it was in the mildest and most lenient form. Then came from the cabinet of George the third those fatal sweeping orders of Nov. 11th, 1807, which prostrated all neutral rights, all the rules of justice, and the maxims of maritime jurisprudence, which had grown up in the usage of ages; And Bonaparte, always prompt and decisive, answered it by the barbarous and cruel decree of Milan.

Thus, whatsoever France has done against us has been instigated by Great Britain, the original authoress of all our wrongs and of all our humiliations. Grasping at the universal dominion of the commercial world, she has brought down upon unoffending nations, upon the United States in a singular manner, in addition to her own flagrant insults and most criminal outrages, the vindictive spirit of the unyielding ruler of the French; who, speaking to us in the terms of an implacable Goth, has not, however, insulted us, like England, with black-hearted hypocrisy, whilst he seizes and devours our property.

From the pestilence of European policy, I turn to col. Monroe's exculpatory letter communicated to Congress on the 2d ultimo by the President of the U. S. and publicly read by Mr. John Randolph in the house of representatives.

That a man should write a book to destroy the reputation of his adversary, may justly be credited; for every day's experience convinces us of the fact: But that any person should deliberately sit down and compose a volume calculated to injure his own character, is no less strange than it is inexplicable. We can attribute it to nothing else than a singular confusion of thought, to which the most enlightened men are sometimes subjected by the consciousness of previous weakness of conduct in the management of great concerns, or an indiscreet use of talents exercised in a manner calculated to discredit their possessor in the public estimation.

The very circumstance of colonel Monroe's having written a vindication, is strong proof of an opinion entertained on his part that the nature of the case required it. A man less convinced of the error of his ministry would have been silent, and have left the question for the decision of his fellow-citizens: Or, if impressed with a strong conviction of the propriety of what he had done on behalf of his country, have cheerfully submitted in noiseless confidence to the judgment of enlightened contemporaries. Let the public decision be as it may, the executive of the United States has exhibited a manliness and a magnanimity in communicating to congress in an official manner the exculpatory letter of colonel Monroe, which must preclude the possibility of any well grounded charge of governmental hostility to that gentleman.

Colonel Monroe very justly exonerates Mr. Pinkney from any share in the terms of his vindication, and candidly observes that he ought not to be considered as having any hand in it. The performance is therefore to be regarded as the individual production, both in style and argument, of the gentleman who offers it to the public; and as such throughout I shall strictly view it.

It is surely a strange assertion from the ex-minister, when he confidently avers, that the grounds on which the interest of American seamen was placed by the British was to us an arrangement both honorable and advantageous. That arrangement did not relinquish the right of impressment: On the contrary, it declared that his Britannic majesty was not prepared to relinquish it; which, in substance, amounted to an absolute refusal. The explanations given were couched in those cozening expressions which presented a phantom of hope to our imaginations in order to delude us. The British commissioners were authorised to give the commissioners of the United States *the most positive assurances* that instructions *had been given* and should be repeated and enforced, to observe the greatest caution in impressing British seamen to preserve the citizens of the U. States from molestation and injury, and that immediate and prompt redress should be afforded on any representation of injury sustained by them. And these are the grounds of an arrangement deemed by colonel Monroe honorable and advantageous! What reliance can we place on *positive assurances* in such a case? By agreeing to pass over a point of such vast importance in a written contract, a point on which our government, under three presidents, for a period of eighteen years, had laid the greatest stress,

and which was the cause of eternal bickerings between the two nations, we virtually waved the topic, and left the British in complete possession of the contested right, on their *mere positive assurances* of good behavior. This was in fact no new arrangement: Such assurances had long before been given, and we had learnt by innumerable and gross violations of our solemn protections granted to mariners, citizens of the United States, sailing under our flag, what little faith could be put in these *most positive* professions. The American negotiator might have found in the past conduct of the British marine, facts sufficient to destroy all the reasoning which the king's commissioners adduced to cajole him into an opinion that we should experience better demeanor in future. They told him, as he informs us, that instructions *had been* given. Yet the effect was precisely the same as if such commands had never gone forth; And to assure us, however positively they might do it, that the same instructions should be reiterated and enforced, was to us no safeguard whatever. We were still subjected to the humiliation of unceasing complaint for the seizure of our seamen, even by the most contemptible of her privateers or letters of marque, to say nothing of the vexatious and insulting conduct of the commanders of her national ships of war. The same forms of demand, proof, and delay as before, were to be encountered by the United States in regaining her citizens piratically taken out of her merchant vessels. The proposition to *postpone the article relative to impressment* was sufficiently explanatory, I should suppose, to have initiated col. Monroe into the whole policy of the British on the question. In a business as important as any other to this coun-

try, they meant to wheedle us by delay, whilst in every thing interesting to Great Britain they were anxious to press a definitive treaty as rapidly as possible. They were willing to bind us up to whatever comported with their welfare; but if our commissioners urged a subject in which the dearest immunities of this country were involved, they were met full in the face with a sophistical evasion, and, with the most overstrained professions of amendment, a postponement of any formal arrangement whatever was insisted on. They complained very loudly of the difficulties of forming any determinate plan to the satisfaction of both parties: But who opposed those difficulties? The United States have always been willing to come to any reasonable understanding which might barely secure our legitimate rights; but in whatever form we have proposed an adjustment, it has been met by the government of Great Britain with excuses, objections, and procrastination, in all the possible shapes of delusion and insincerity.

It appears to me one of the most extraordinary things imaginable, how a man of considerable intelligence in public concerns generally, as I presume col. Monroe to be, could in the first place become the dupe of promises so flimsily made, and afterwards in order to justify his own credulity turn advocate for the integrity of a British ministry! The colonel not only suffered himself to be imposed on, but very triumphantly advances as a circumstance in palliation of his own acquiescence, that as a *motive* for the postponement of the article relative to impressment, and the *condition* of it, he was assured that the British commissioners were instructed still to entertain the dis-

cussion of any plan which could be devised to secure the interests of both nations without injury to the rights of either. This very assurance of future discussion would, to my mind, have been ample evidence of a disposition to evade the question by putting it off indefinitely. It was a complete prevarication, which, taken in connection with the declaration that the king was not prepared to relinquish the right of impressment, spoke as emphatically as words could speak, that they would, indeed, *entertain* us with negotiations on the subject as long as we pleased; but as to going any further, or putting pen to paper by way of security to us against future encroachment, we need not in the least expect it.

With regard to a disputed right, where the interests of two parties clash, it is certainly nothing but reasonable that both sides should give way a little for the purpose of accommodation. But with respect to the impressment of citizens of the United States, the British government has never yielded a single point, but has invariably contended to the uttermost for the privilege to examine the crews of all merchant vessels, and to seize, on naked suspicion, such persons as in the opinion of the most inferior officer might be alledged to be English subjects. Considering the small foundation on which that government builds its claim to such seizures, even of her natural born subjects, there was solid reason to expect from it the exercise of such a power with more moderation and discretion than she has usually evinced: For the claim which the British monarch lays in such a forcible way is not sanctioned by the laws of his realm, as they now exist, with regard to allegiance. In times past, from

the period that William the Norman introduced the feudal system into England, till the grant of Magna Charta by king John, and even up to the reign of Charles the second and the English revolution, when the crown was abdicated by James the second, the principle of fealty, which was the very essence of the feudal tenures, bound every man, from the lord to the villein, with "life, and limb, and earthly honor," to defend the nation at the call of the chief of the kingdom. But when, after various struggles, the prerogative of the crown, which was bottomed on the feudal tenures, was exchanged for the present settlement of the royal authority, the people of Great Britain were considered as having regained their rights, which they had anciently enjoyed under their Saxon princes, with considerable enlargements suggested by the intelligence of modern times. The complicated tie which under the duke of Normandy and his successors bound the vassal to his lord and the lord to the king, was broken; and the subject was left to a free choice whether he would remain in the service of his prince, or depart from his jurisdiction and enter into the community of another nation. Such is the law of England, rightly construed; and notwithstanding any different construction by implication, the day cannot be very distant when it must be formally acknowledged by the British in practice if not in theory.

It must be very clear to every man who will give himself the trouble to examine the subject, that no possible instructions to commanders of vessels of war, no arrangement which depends solely upon the British themselves, can prove effectual against the abusive exercise of the privilege

which they claim ; and that by the least and most informal act on our part, with regard to the relinquishment of our rights ; or suffering by acquiescence the smallest interval to creep into the continuity of our claim on that head, we tacitly yield to Great Britain a supremacy over us, which in fact amounts in that particular to sovereign jurisdiction. On the grounds which colonel Monroe believes to be both honorable and advantageous to this country, the United States were placed in the situation of a perpetual plaintiff, whilst Great Britain is at the same time the overbearing defendant and the inexorable judge. Our seamen are forcibly taken and detained by the British. To whom do we appeal for redress ? To a third power ? No ! To the British. It is in vain that the English government quotes in its justification her ancient usages ? they are not applicable. Admitting that one improper act could justify another, there has never existed a nation on whom the exercise of impressment on their part could create such numerous misunderstandings. Our language, our habits, our appearance are the same.— Do these circumstances apologize for her frequent indiscriminations ?— Then it ought to teach her more delicacy in regard to our citizens ; and make her cautious in exercising a power where in doing herself a little right she may do us a great deal of wrong. Would she submit to a similar conduct from the United States ? I feel assured she would not. Yet we are, like her, an independent nation, and entitled in the estimation of the world to a community of national rights and a reciprocity of national privileges. The more I consider this subject, the more firmly and solemnly am I convinced, that colonel Mon-

roe suffered himself to be led counter to that course of procedure which the dignity and interests of his country required.

Let me now draw the attention of the reader to Monroe's treaty, and to a few observations which I shall offer on the leading articles of it. For it is in this way I shall more effectually answer colonel Monroe's defence.

I select the third article, (as embracing a subject of deep interest to the commercial portion of the American people,) for primary consideration. That article involves the traffic entertained between the citizens of the United States and the possessions of the British in the East Indies : a navigation and trade which in times past have been very beneficial to this country, and which, with regard to Great Britain, have been extremely profitable to her possessions in the east. It is well known to men intimately acquainted with the business, that *silver* is actually necessary to the very existence of that quarter of the British empire, and that at all times it is difficult for them to procure it, more particularly during the prevalence of war. The intercourse between the United States and British India is maintained with silver, which is there invested in the *refuse* of those goods which remain on hand after the most choice and excellent of them have been selected by the English India company for their own purposes ; and the goods thus purchased by the Americans are taken at very high prices. Theorists, at first view, might suppose this trade to be detrimental to the British ; but in truth so profitable has it been found to the company by affording the means of disposing of their surplus articles after their own demands had been satisfied, that they have never thrown the least

obstruction in the way of it. Among the native and British inhabitants of India the trade is extremely popular, and being so highly beneficial to them they could not consider the loss of it otherwise than hurtful to their interests in the highest degree. The data upon which these facts are founded are within the knowledge of every person engaged in that commerce, and afforded great room for an American negotiator most strenuously to urge more favorable terms than those which the third article offers. Col. Monroe's habits of study, I apprehend, have not led him profoundly into the consideration of mercantile or commercial subjects; and I do not think I venture an assertion wide of the mark, when I suppose him not to have been sufficiently versed in the various branches of traffic in which the merchants of this country are most immediately concerned. Navigation and trade to India is of the most eminent advantage to the United States. Prior to Jay's treaty those who adventured in it derived immense gain, and even after the operation of that treaty moderate profits have resulted. I will go a little into detail upon the subject in order more clearly to lay it open to public view.

Previously to Jay's treaty American vessels freely navigated to and from British India direct, or in any other way which appeared to them the most lucrative. Some went directly thither, freighted with specie; others with only a portion of specie, and touched at Madeira, where on a credit, they purchased wine, from whence they proceeded to the different ports in India, selling wherever they found it to most advantage. They afterwards returned either directly to the United States, to the Italian ports, or

to Ostend, with cotton goods, silk handkerchiefs, sugar, pepper, salt-petre, &c. &c. Many took a cargo of our own produce to some of the European ports, where by the gain and freight thereon they extended their funds, and in order to complete their return cargoes they drew on their friends in London or Amsterdam, making payment to them in produce of our own, which they sent to them, or by bills drawn by other persons for American produce sold in Europe; and with the dollars purchased in Europe proceeded to India, from whence they returned home or went to Europe.

The preceding modes were followed by men of capital, proved very advantageous to navigation and commerce, and to both were attended with the most important consequences.

A third and a different method, associated intimately with commerce, embraced more particularly our navigation.

From the United States ships sailed in ballast or with some few trifles to defray charges, and with provisions and stores on board sufficient for two years. Arrived in India, they were let to freight from one port to another, and in the course of the two years often gained as much by their labor as qualified them to buy an ample and valuable cargo. This it will be observed, was procured without capital; and with such cargo they returned to America.

Many cargo ships went to Bombay, sure of obtaining at that place a full and profitable freight of cotton for China; which, being added to half a capital taken in specie with them, or by bills drawn upon their owners from Canton, put it in their power to return home completely laden. The

Bombay freights were immensely profitable; and the system was in no wise injurious to the British; for by that means they were furnished with ships and mariners on reasonable terms to carry for them. The trade was thus enlivened; and, indeed, without our aid it would stagnate for want of the necessary means of transportation. Their India possessions require a vast coasting trade, for which, without our assistance, they have neither country ships nor a sufficiency of men. They also derived a large profit from our industry in this particular, for the proceeds were invested in their sugar, pepper, and manufactures. When war prevails, it is well known that her enemy interests the coasting trade of the British dominions in the East, whilst American vessels are suffered freely to pass. This circumstance demonstrates that our agency must be highly to their interest, besides the introduction by us of those manufactures, purchased by the gains of our labor, into the countries and colonies of her enemies. That the interruption of English commerce in the Indian seas in time of war is not a chimerical notion, I need only appeal to the successful efforts of the French admiral Linois in that quarter, who, notwithstanding he afterwards imprudently threw himself and his wealth thus acquired into the way of his enemy, whereby he lost it, yet proved for several years a prodigious scourge to the trade of Great Britain in that part of the globe. Nor can it be necessary particularly to remind the reader with what extraordinary success, even with the prevailing maritime supremacy of the English, the enterprizes of French privateers have been recently crowned, they having even scoured without impediment the

bay of Bengal, and made prize of some of the finest and richest Indian men which the British possess.

The treaty made by Mr. Jay completely destroyed this valuable portion of our intercourse with India; and likewise cut off another very profitable branch of our commerce in that part of the world. Vessels of the United States had found a most advantageous employment by supplying Manilla for its own consumption, and the ships which annually sail thence to Peru, with India goods; and Batavia and the Isles of France and Bourbon with similar articles. Had not Jay's treaty interfered, this trade would have acquired a vast extent, and yielded to the Americans an immensity of profit.

In these facts we find abundant proof that it has not been so much to benefit herself as to curtail our foreign and flourishing trade that whenever Great Britain enters upon negotiation she ties up our hands with cords of restriction, even in cases where it would be to her own advantage to suffer them to remain at liberty. Before the war of 1793, between Great Britain and France, the former suffered us to enjoy in her East India dominions a free and unrestrained trade; but no sooner had that event taken place, than fearful of the enterprize of our merchants and the industry of our hardy mariners, she commenced a vexatious interruption of our commerce under the specious guise of annoying her enemy; but which was dictated in a spirit of hostility to neutrals, and to this country in particular, because we were the most formidable neutrals, and the most likely, in any event, to rival the extensive trade of the English. She harrassed our navigation until she forced us into the treaty concluded at

London by Mr. Jay ; which, as I have shewn, cut off in the Eastern World, the most profitable part of our commerce. Colonel Monroe was fully aware of the hostile spirit of the British commercial interests to granting any thing at all favorable to the prosperity of the United States ; and seems in truth to have given way to it ; fearful, perhaps, that if he did not secure something for us on the various points embraced by his mission, we should have lost the whole : But in this the American negociator appears to have been divested of his usual sagacity ; or in fact, as I have already hinted, was not sufficiently versed in our commercial pursuits to understand all the strong and weak points of the question ; and that, too, was pretty much the case with John Jay. It would have been far better for the former and for the latter also, to have made no treaty, than by making one to have signed away rights which we had enjoyed, and which, in all probability, considering the benefit to themselves, the British would have permitted us to enjoy by courtesy without any formal written acknowledgment of a right of enjoyment existing in us.

During the operation of the provisions of Jay's treaty, and since likewise, ships of the United States have continued to go to Europe with cargoes, invested the proceeds thereof in dollars, with which they have proceeded to British India, bought cargoes, and in general returned directly home. They have never been interrupted in this trade ; it has always been considered as conformable to the very letter of that treaty, which so much injured us in a most important particular by compelling all our ships which should load in the ports of British India to return *direct* to the United States.

Our ships often created funds by freighting and by a trade with the native nations, or with the French, Dutch, and Spanish possessions beyond the Cape of Good Hope, which they laid out in the manufactures of the British settlements and returned home. It occurred every year that vessels which left the United States with specie on board, destined to Mocha, the Mauritius, and to Batavia, for coffee, were not able to procure cargoes there, and for a return cargo were compelled to proceed to Calcutta. Many ships go to the Mauritius and some to Batavia, with dry goods, (principally the manufactures of Great Britain) where they sell them, together with the residue of their cargoes, generally consisting of beef, pork, flour, and iron. Being unable to procure coffee there, they proceed, with the dollars obtained for their goods, to India for return cargoes.

Such intermediate methods of carrying on the India trade, have invariably been a great convenience and frequently profitable ; and of no injury whatever to Great Britain, who by this means has been enabled to introduce her home manufactures into the colonies of her enemies, from whence she draws the specie, which is thus placed on the very spot where the British government most requires it. A new investment on the part of the Americans then takes place in the manufactures of British India ; a circumstance which, not being calculated upon at the commencement of the voyage, creates a surplus beyond the quantity required for the markets of the United States ; and by the want of the home demand we are compelled to find means of vent therefor, which can be done in no other way than by conveying it to countries to which British shipping

cannot have access; that is, to the colonies of the enemies of Great Britain, from whom are drawn specie and various articles which assist us in paying for the vast quantity of those English home manufactures which we every year draw from Great Britain for our own use and for foreign commerce.

The third article of the new treaty completely deprives us of all the advantages that might be derived from this intermediate trade. We are compelled to go direct to India, and return direct to the U. States. We are permitted to turn neither one way nor the other. Deprived of the privileges of stopping in Europe to purchase dollars, and prevented from touching either at the Mauritius, at Batavia, or elsewhere, to obtain the means of buying a cargo in India, we are reduced to a direct line of operation which cramps the adventurous spirit of our citizens, curtails our trade at least one half, and compels us to pay out of our own pockets, with more limited means, a large balance to Great Britain which heretofore we had been enabled to discharge by making other nations tributary to our enterprising industry.

It is only in dollars that the India trade can be carried on. In what way are we to procure them? When war prevails between Great Britain and Spain, the latter is compelled to suffer us to resort to her colonial ports, to which, in addition to European goods, we carry our own beef, pork, fish, and flour; for which we get dollars. But at a period when Spain is at peace, from what source are we to draw dollars? We shall not then be admitted into her colonies. We must resort to Amsterdam, London, Leghorn, or Lisbon, to obtain them:

And can we afford the charges, that will accrue in consequence thereof, and carry on an advantageous trade? Dollars are freighted from Europe at one and an half per cent. the insurance amounts to two per cent. and the loss of interest is at least two per cent. more; which, altogether, would amount to a new charge upon the trade of five and an half per cent. To this we may add the very great uncertainty of the supply of silver arriving at the proper time for the India trade. Ships in that trade, ought always to depart from our ports between the first of February and the first of May. Under such circumstances the United States would be drained of specie. Every dollar in silver would be exported from the country, and a most deplorable inundation of paper currency would spread itself throughout the union, creating great dissatisfaction among the people, and tending essentially to lessen that confidence in the transactions of all classes of our own citizens, so indispensably necessary to a vigorous prosecution of internal trade and improvements.

The third article, in truth, trammels the traffic with such unprecedented difficulties, it is very questionable whether it would be thought worth the pursuit; and at any rate, if it were pursued under all the embarrassments thrown in its way, it would be with a languor before unknown to the American character. It may, indeed, be considered problematical, whether the goods might not be purchased cheaper at the India company's sales in London, than in the East Indies, loaded as the trade is under the third article of Monroe's treaty with such new charges and difficulties, which appear to surround and hem it in on every side.

The East India article in Jay's treaty has ever been considered by intelligent men, as extremely injurious to our navigation and commerce. But the third article in the new treaty is past all endurance. It adds most astonishingly to the injury; and the mere admission and introduction on the part of colonel Monroe of such an article will, I very much apprehend, be attended with the most pernicious effects: It will give the scent to the British, and they may hereafter be induced occasionally to effect the same thing by custom-house regulations: But it would be preferable to risk that, than by concurring in such an article, rivet upon ourselves by a treaty an evil of the greatest magnitude to our trade. It is no vague suggestion to suppose that the operations of the new third article would reduce the navigation engaged in the India trade from the United States to at least one half the present number of tons. The American trade to British India under Jay's treaty yielded no extraordinary profit. It has afforded, on an average calculation, not exceeding fifteen per cent. annual interest, with the advantage which we enjoyed of being at peace, whilst all the world besides was involved in war.

It is very certain that the British nation are under as much obligation to us, for our commerce, as the United States are to them for permission to trade to India; a permission which they granted without restriction to the Portuguese and Danes. It is difficult, from the want of sufficient data, to ascertain the number of dollars annually imported into India by American vessels. The amount imported into China in the years 1803, 1804, and 1805, amounted to four millions eight hundred and thirty seven thousand three hundred; and it

is presumable that the importation into India was nearly, if not quite, as great. If such be the fact, are we to suppose that the British will depart from their interest so far as to exclude a trade which produces to them such a vast amount of specie, and the deprivation of the supply of which would present a great difficulty to themselves in finding dollars wherewith to pay off their troops?

There are substantial reasons for belief that the British would, without a written contract to that effect, suffer us to carry on the trade, at least in the degree we have enjoyed it under Jay's treaty. I think I can perceive, in all the negotiations and diplomatic arrangements between the United States and Great Britain, that the latter has invariably acted on the principle of conceding nothing of consequence to us by compact which she can control in practice. It is her desire at all times to hold the master springs of commerce in her own hands, so that she may brace or relax them at pleasure. In many cases she will where there exists no provision by treaty on the subject, and it is her interest to do so, display an extraordinary liberality. But attempt to bring her to the test; make but an effort to bind her up to the continued observance of that liberal spirit, and she refuses. She will negotiate on the topic, it is true; but she will not agree to any written stipulation except it still leaves to herself the whole latitude of restriction or relaxation. Hence, in a question of traffic, it is sometimes better, in treating with her, to submit to the risk of prohibitory custom-house regulations, than to adopt an article which positively excludes advantages that may, without the existence of that article, be enjoyed.

Between the Danish ports of Sa-

lempore and Tranquebar, and those of Calcutta and Madras, a free commerce is enjoyed. The two former might and would become places of deposit for us, where a free trade would be afforded to our ships, and goods be furnished to our merchants on terms infinitely more advantageous than they could be procured under the stipulations of the third article.

It would have been much more acceptable to commercial men, had our India trade been placed upon a footing similar to that of our intercourse with the West Indies as stated in the sixth article; or rather, indeed, that the treaty had been entirely silent on the subject altogether, and the trade suffered to rely for its continuance on the reciprocal advantages derived from it by each nation; for they are in reality such to British India as would tempt them successfully at almost all times to receive our vessels on terms equivalent to those guaranteed to us by Jay's treaty. If such an article were not admitted into the treaty, our intercourse with British India might have been carried on in silence, which has been the case since Jay's treaty expired; and eventually we might gradually and imperceptibly have slid into the enjoyment of those benefits which we experienced previously to the existence of that instrument.

A concise view of the trade of the Danish settlements, and of the commerce which by the Portuguese and Danes is carried on with British India, can neither be unprofitable nor unacceptable to the reader.

The Danish settlement of Tranquebar is situated upon the coast of Coromandel, distant from Madras about one hundred and sixty-five miles. The goods usually shipped

at Madras can be procured at Tranquebar on terms very little different from those on which they are purchased at Madras: But in consequence of its being a more extensive mart, there is a preferable convenience in obtaining a cargo at the latter. The conclusion, however, is very natural and forcible, that if the demands of the traders of the United States were transferred to Tranquebar, a larger and more abundant market would speedily be created there. At the time col. Monroe concluded the unfortunate treaty, vast quantities of goods were shipped from Tranquebar for Manilla, Batavia, and the Isle of France; and these were supplied from their own resources, as well as from those of the British residencies. The proportion of goods for American commerce drawn from Madras and its vicinity, is comparatively insignificant. The great demand by merchants of the United States is for articles which are in general shipped at Calcutta: Twelve miles higher up the river Hoogly lies Salempore, belonging to the Danes; a settlement from whence goods are shipped on terms as satisfactory as those for which they can be purchased at Calcutta; the only inconvenience being that they cannot be procured there conveniently in such large quantities as they can at the latter place.

The Danes purchase at Calcutta freely and without any governmental impositions, whatever goods they may want: And if necessary, the Americans might cause them to be transported at a very trivial expence to their vessels lying at Salempore.— Danish ships actually lay at Calcutta and receive their cargoes from the two places. Let the demand only be withdrawn from Calcutta to Salempore.

pore, and it would immediately attract the attention of the Black Merchants to the latter; and in all probability, within the course of a few years yield a supply fully sufficient to satisfy the demand. The goods of the East India company are derived principally from their own residencies and are made by their own workmen. Those which are brought to Calcutta to be sold, are bought up by the Black Merchants, who convey them down the river, passing by Salempore, and deliver them to the rich native merchants, (for they do not sell to the whites,) from whom, in the season preceding, they had received the money requisite for the customary advances which they are obliged to make to the indigent manufacturer, who can effect nothing without an advance of money. It is from those wealthy native merchants that the Americans, trading to Calcutta, derive their cargoes; and it would be easy to bring them to an understanding on the subject, so that the necessary goods might be delivered at Salempore. During the late and existing wars of Europe they have furnished Manilla, and the possessions of the Dutch and French, unrestricted, with cotton goods, silk, opium, &c. &c. which are bought and shipped at Calcutta to an immense amount. Had not Jay's treaty interfered the Americans would have enjoyed this trade, which is productive of very great advantages to the British themselves; for by it a vent is made for their manufactures which in no other way could be created. There would have been a vast increase of it if we could have enjoyed a share of it. The trade to Salempore has in truth been tried, by the owners of the ship Kensington, of Philadelphia, who dispatched her to that place, where she took in her car-

go, with which she proceeded for Ostend: She stopped, on her passage, at St. Helena, where she was seized by the governor, who alledged that as she had received her cargo in *British waters*, she was liable, under the treaty, to condemnation, because the treaty prevented the ships of the U. States from trading from British India direct to Europe. When the case came to trial, the ship and cargo were released, and the offending governor amerced in a fine that nearly ruined him.

To Calcutta there are annually carried by the Portuguese from one to two millions of hard dollars, and these are laid out in cotton goods, with which they proceed direct for Lisbon. The British in India receive them with open arms, treat them kindly, court their commerce, and impose no restrictions upon them. The ships are compelled to return to Lisbon by the laws of Portugal, because the government derives a duty of twenty-five per cent. from them, and because the goods with which they are laden being generally intended for the trade of Brazil, must in the first instance, according to the colonial system of Portugal, be brought to the parent country.

The inferences to be drawn from the preceding facts and reasoning require little illustration. With regard to our own intercourse with British India, the third article degrades us below the Portuguese and Danes, (when neutral,) and instead of improving our trade in that quarter, places us in a worse situation than the treaty made by John Jay.

In the estimation of the reader I dare say this subject has already occupied too great a portion of the pages of this week's Register. I therefore shall close it until my succeeding

number, when I will return to it with renewed vigor, as well as to the exculpatory letter of col. Monroe, which, in my opinion, is inconsistent in itself and fatal to the reputation of the writer.

CONGRESSIONAL.—For the greater part of this week the House of Representatives have been occupied with a bill for raising an additional military force. Although the opposition to it was small in point of numbers, yet in regard to determined resistance, and perseverance in that determination, I do not believe that the journals of congress afford an example of a more regular, systematic, teasing hostility to the adoption of any measure, than was exhibited to the bill in question by John Randolph, and one or two other orators.

The bill drew forth candid explanations from its friends and denunciations from its foes. The latter spared no pains to render the bill unpopular; whilst the former merely endeavored to justify their votes to the nation at large.

I shall not here enter into a detail of the arguments offered on either side; but on a measure which I am confident will be mistated and misrepresented, I may be allowed to offer a few remarks.

In the first place we must, in order to judge correctly of the propriety of raising an additional military force, recur to the actual situation of this country, and to the policy which our government pursues.

Great Britain and France, by edicts and orders, have endeavored to embroil us in the wars of Europe: We have determined to remain neutral: But in the preservation of our neutrality, such are the singular circumstances of the world, it is high-

ly probable we may be compelled to fight on the defensive if not on the offensive. It is allowed on all hands that it is our interest to avoid any connection with either of the European powers; and in the pursuance of that object, any war measures must partake, like our peace system, of a neutral character; that is, we shall fight for ourselves and by ourselves, without any copartnership with France or Great Britain.

Our pacific neutrality having been partly broken down by the belligerents, it becomes necessary to prepare for a war neutrality: But, as we contemplate no distant enterprizes, or transmarine conquests, it was requisite to form nothing more than the embryo of a war system, which, in the event of formidable invasion might be rapidly perfected to a mature state, or in case of definitive peace and harmony be easily dissipated. Accordingly we saw the gun boat bill pass; appropriations made for fortifications; and, in the case of the present bill, a small number of regular forces, put in a train of organization. If danger accumulates upon us, we can increase them; if it lessens, we can diminish them.

This I consider to be the real policy of the measures of a warlike cast, adopted by the present congress. They were rendered necessary by the position the executive part of the government had assumed; and that position has been emphatically sanctioned by the acclamations of the American people.

With regard to Mr. Randolph's objections, even had not that gentleman obtained a licence for inconsistency, they bear no weight whatever. He proceeds upon the ground, that because the republicans in 1798 refused to sanction a standing army, in 1808

they ought to do so too : As if men were not to be governed by circumstances, and were to sleep in the same quietness when their habitations are in flames as when they are secure from the attacks of the incendiary. With what contempt do we hear a man fatigue himself and his hearers by preaching in the face of common sense. The same orator who at the commencement of this very session of congress condemned the executive for his tardy measures, and who declared that an embargo ought long before to have been laid, and Canada seized on, now talks of peace and good will with all the holy fervor of a consummate hypocrite.

It is indeed, a little more than curious, that whenever Great Britain is seriously in question, and the vote comes to be taken on any topic that can affect her, Randolph flies the course. Two years ago he would have *chastised* Spain, with the whole French empire at her heels ; and brought in a report and resolution to raise troops for the purpose. But now the mention of creating a small regular force, fills him with horrible scruples.—Well might Mr. Macon abandon him. Such a man as Mr. Randolph, if strictly followed, will, like a delusive meteor, lead legislators in among brakes, and briars, and brambles, and quagmires, where they will be left to stick in total disgrace.

STURDY POLITICIANS.—In these blessed times, when federalism itself puts on the garb of patriotism as a mask, it is not a trifle that will satisfy some of our political writers.—They want an alliance with Great Britain, and nothing short of that will satisfy them. It is in vain, there-

fore, that you press upon them the most irrefutable facts in defence of the administration : They are not satisfied. So long as we resist G. Britain, so long, according to them, our government will be in error, and the angry gentlemen will grumble. It gives them in truth, a more serious heart-ache, to see aggressions from that quarter manfully resisted, than it would to witness the conflagration of one of our cities on the sea coast by the operations of a British fleet : But France ; to mention her, sets them in a most flaming fury, and they are ready in an instant to beard Bonaparte to the muzzle ! Precious souls that they are : Brave alone in rendering the laws of the United States obnoxious to the people ; they preach up riot and sedition against the embargo act ; and, in the same breath, with a canting whine they talk about their love of country and respect for the laws. Whip me, genuine Honesty, such pitiful fellows out of the country !

THE QUESTION SETTLED.—So popular has the nomination of Mr. Madison become among the *great body of the people*, that the leaders of the late *hue and cry* against the conventional proceedings are trembling for their own standing. It is not to be wondered at, that the freemen of this country should so warmly support a man whose whole life has been laboriously and successfully devoted to their service.

Gentlemen who are desirous of subscribing to the *Weekly Register*, are informed that they can be provided with the numbers from the commencement.